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Abstract 
 
The economic sanctions can be approached from two 
different perspectives. In the narrative of the 
international law and international economic law the 
economic sanctions are legal instruments applied 
exceptionally with the aim of implementing objectives 
of foreign and security policy. The legality of the 
measures requires here the justification of legal 
concepts (e.g. the essential security of the sanctioning 
country). From the perspective of the international 
relations and foreign policy, however, the legality of 
the measure plays no significant role. The justification 
of the sanction is based on the pure interest of the 
country, therefore the legality is only a formal 
question of how to adopt and implement the measures 
and not a prerequisite for the justification itself. The 
paper intends to examine the legal narrative of 
economic sanctions in order to establish the criteria of 
their legality and to apply this concept to the sanctions 
imposed by the European Union on the Russian 
Federation. The paper will argue, however, that the 
economic sanctions are Janus-faced instruments of 
international relations: even though it can be 
interpreted by way of external trade policy and law 
considerations, in practical terms, their fundamental 
objectives unavoidably stretch beyond the legal 
narrative and may appear to merely serve the foreign 
policy of the country. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The economic sanctions are Janus-faced instruments 
of international relations. On the one hand, the legal 
basis of economic sanctions is well anchored in 
international law and international economic law that 
lay down the framework of application of sanctions in 
a collective way under the umbrella of the United 
Nations or in a unilateral manner without specific 
mandate of the international community. In this 
narrative, the economic sanctions are legal instruments 
that are to be applied exceptionally in order to 
implement objectives of foreign and security policy. 
These instruments are logically similar concepts to the 
public policy exceptions of international economic 
law, where the legality of the exceptional measures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
always requires justification on specific policy (moral, 
public policy, environmental etc.) grounds.  
On the other hand, the economic sanctions are also 
interpreted as instruments of foreign policy, which 
implies the second face of these restrictive measures. 
From this point of view, the legality of the measure 
plays no significant role. The justification for the 
sanction is here not based on legal concepts, but only 
on the pure interest  or in terms of the dominant 
realist paradigm: the national interest1 of the 
country, therefore the legality is only a formal 
question (e.g. in which form the sanction could be 
implemented), but not a prerequisite for the 
justification.  
Taking the perspective of the first face of the 
economic sanctions and examining these measures as 
legal instruments, the main objective of the paper is to 
establish the criteria of their legality and to apply this 
concept to the sanctions imposed by the European 
Union on the Russian Federation after the annexation 
of Crimea and escalation of crisis in Ukraine in 2014. 
Forasmuch as the EU measures are considered 
unilateral economic sanctions, the analysis restricts its 
scope to the context of the international economic law 
and pay less attention to the whole international law 
complexity of sanctions. 2 
U-Russia 
II.), the paper places conceptually the 
economic sanctions into the context of the 
international economic law (III.); then the criteria of 
legality is applied to the EU sanctions in the 
subsequent chapter (IV.); and finally, the paper is 
closed by conclusion (V.). 
 
II. The EU sanctions on Russia
 
In 2014, after Russia has annexed Crimea, the EU 
Member States decided to impose complex economic 
sanctions on Russia, as EU diplomatic efforts  
1 Here I refer only to a general definition of national interest, 
namely it includes the perceived needs and desires of one 
state in relation to other states comprising the external 
environment, in other words national interest always says 
what is best for a society in foreign affairs. See ROSENAU, 
J. (1968): National Interest, p. 34 40; NUECHTERLEIN, D. 
(1976): National Interests and Foreign Policy: A Conceptual 
Framework for Analysis and Decision-Making, p. 246 266.  
2 For a detailed analysis, see: ALEXANDER, K. (2009): 
Economic sanctions; BOSSCHE, P. v. d. / ZDOUC, W. 
(2013): The Law and Policy of the World Trade 
Organization; and ABASS, A. / WHITE, N. (2006): 
policy without unilateral alternatives? 
Diverging narratives of economic sanctions some observations on 
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intended to compel the Russian Federation to act 
decisively to prevent the further escalation of the 
Ukrainian crisis had been proven ineffective.3 The 
early sanctions contained restrictions on Russian and 
Ukrainian individuals (freezing of private assets and 
travel bans),4 however, as the deepening conflict 
between Russia and Ukraine escalated, the Council 
repeatedly amended the sanction legislation and 
expanded the scope of application of the restrictive 
measures. The most recent substantive amendments 
were effected in December 20175 and March 20186 
and the sanctions have been extended until July 2018 
(economic sanctions) as well as September 2018 
(individual restrictive measures) and March 2019 
(asset freezes against certain persons).7  
The aim of the economic sanctions imposed by the 
European Union was to condemn and punish Russia 
for its role in the intensification of the Ukrainian crisis 
and the related legal measures build on two main 
objectives. First, as a general objective, the sanctions 
3 On the historic context of the escalation of the Russia
Ukraine crisis and the imposition of EU sanctions, see: 
Doraev, M. (2015): The "Memory Effect" of Economic 
Sanctions Against Russia, p. 355 -Citak, M. 
(2015): Crimean conflict  from the perspectives of Russia, 
Ukraine, and public international law, p. 23 45.; Horvathy, 
B. / Nyircsak, A. (2014): EU-Russia Sanctions War. Part I: 
HPOPs Research 
Group, Budapest. (6 October 2014, available at: 
http://hpops.tk.mta.hu/en/blog/2014/10/eu-russia-sanctions-
war-part-i-the-legal-framework).  
4 Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP of 17 March 2014 
concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions 
undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, 
sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L 78, 
17/03/2014); and Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 
17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of 
actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, 
sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L 78, 
17/03/2014). 
5 Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2426 of 21 December 2017 
amending Decision 2014/512/CFSP concerning restrictive 
measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the 
situation in Ukraine (OJ L 343, 22.12.2017).  
6 Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/388 of 12 
March 2018 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 
concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions 
undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, 
sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L 69, 
13.3.2018).  
7 The economic sanctions has been extended by the Council 
on 21 December 2017 and are in force until 31 July 2018 
(see: Russia: EU prolongs economic sanctions by six months, 
Press Release of the Council, 821/17; 21/12/2017) and the 
restrictive measures relating to asset freeze and travel bans 
has been prolonged on 12 March 2018 until 15 September 
2018 (see: EU prolongs sanctions over actions against 
Ukraine's territorial integrity until 15 September 2018, Press 
Release of the Council, 120/18; 12/03/2018). Moreover, on 5 
March 2018 the Council extended also the assets freezes of 
individuals responsible for the misappropriation of Ukrainian 
state funds until 6 March 2019 (see: Misappropriation of 
Ukrainian state funds: EU prolongs asset freezes against 13 
persons by one year, Press Release of the Council, 104/18; 
05/03/2018). 
put pressure on Russia to abandon policies that 
escalate the Ukrainian crisis, i.e. any actions that 
undermine the territorial integrity and sovereignty of 
Ukraine, thereby endangering the stability and security 
of the region (e.g. cessation of military support for 
pro-Russian separatists). Second, the economic 
sanctions also constitute a response to the violations of 
human rights committed in Ukraine and to the 
annexation of part of Ukraine and are aimed at 
decision-makers, politicians, companies and other 
legal entities that can be held liable for the occurrence 
of these infringements. On the basis of these 
objectives, it is therefore evident that the economic 
sanctions imposed by the European Union serve the 
purpose of achieving broader foreign policy and 
security policy goals, and should be considered 
relevant not merely on the basis of their economic 
content. Hermann van Rompuy, former President of 
the European Council was therefore apt when he 
described the nature of the EU sanctions as belonging 
to the arsenal of foreign policy, and representing "not 
an objective in themselves, but a means of achieving 
an objective".8 
Therefore, the economic sanctions are markedly easier 
to interpret as instruments of foreign policy rather than 
as legal instruments. However, it cannot be disputed 
that the Treaties lay down the basic legal framework 
and thereby limit the European Union's scope for 
policy action when it comes to applying economic 
sanctions. In line with this, since no international (UN) 
embargo is in force relating to the Ukrainian crisis, the 
economic sanctions analyzed here may be considered 
autonomous policy instruments of the European 
Union. 
Three types of sanctions imposed by the European 
Union can be distinguished.9 Some are general 
economic and trade restrictions, others are restrictive 
measures on the assets and movement of individuals, 
and there are particular provisions of economic 
diplomacy. The first category, namely economic and 
trade sanctions against the Russian Federation and the 
Crimean Peninsula entails the introduction by the EU 
of a general export and import ban on products on the 
Common Military List of the European Union.10 These 
restrictions were subsequently extended to include the 
export of so-called dual-use goods and technologies, 
and special import restrictions were imposed on 
products from the Crimean region. An exception to 
8 EU strengthens sanctions against actions undermining 
Ukraine's territorial integrity (Press Release of the Council, 
21/03/2014, available at: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/press
data/EN/foraff/141741.pdf.)  
9 See for an alternative categorization, GRUSZCZYNSKI, L./ 
MENKES, M. (2017): Legality of the EU Trade Sanctions 
Imposed on the Russian Federation under WTO Law, p. 39
41. 
10 Common Military List of the European Union (equipment 
covered by Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP 
defining common rules governing the control of exports of 
military technology and equipment, 17 March 2014), OJ C 
107/1 (09/04/2014). 
these rules are cases where the "clean" origin of a 
product is certified by official Ukrainian documents.11
In addition, certain investment activities are also 
subject to restrictions. These restrictions impact 
investments in Russia in the transport, 
telecommunications and energy sectors, including 
projects in oil and gas production as well as mining. 
The hold on investment was augmented by a ban on 
the export of vital products and technologies for these 
strategic sectors, with the provision of financial and 
insurance services related to such projects also being 
prohibited. 
The second category of sanctions includes the freezing 
of certain assets and shares as well as travel bans for 
individuals (natural persons and companies). 
According to the latest data (15 May 2018), asset 
freeze and travel bans are in force against 150 persons 
and 38 companies, which includes a number of 
companies in the Crimean region whose ownership 
changed  in the wake of the annexation  in 
contravention of Ukrainian law.12 
Measures aimed at freezing of assets include 
investments and economic interests of any kind of the 
persons designated by the EU provisions, including 
cash, cheques, bank deposits, stocks and shares, etc. In 
practice, this means that the persons concerned do not 
have access to, and cannot sell or transfer these assets. 
Travel restrictions affect individuals in that the person 
is denied entry into the European Union. The Council 
maintains the list of sanctioned persons in addendums 
to the legislation while also providing for legal 
remedy: the persons concerned have the right to 
comment on the list, as well as have the opportunity to 
challenge the Council decision at the European Court 
of Justice.13 
Moreover the second category also includes specific 
restrictions imposing obligations on EU citizens and 
businesses in the context of the action against Russia, 
particularly restrictions on Russian state-owned banks, 
based on which EU citizens and businesses may not 
conduct financial transactions with the banks under 
11 Council Decision 2014/386/CFSP of 23 June 2014 
concerning restrictions on goods originating in Crimea or 
Sevastopol, in response to the illegal annexation of Crimea 
and Sevastopol. 
12 See the current list of persons and entities under EU 
restrictive measures is available in the Annex of the 
consolidated version of Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP.  
13 Decision has so far been reached in the case of Andriy 
Portnov, former deputy leader of the Ukrainian president's 
administration: the Court upheld Portnov's appeal, annulled 
the freezing of his assets and stated that listing Portnov's 
name had not complied with the criteria of the EU law. See 
also other cases before the Tribunal: T-331/14 Mykola 
Yanovych Azarov v. Council (Prime Minister of Ukraine 
2010 to 2014); T-339/14 Serhiy Vitaliyovych Kurchenko v. 
Council (Ukrainian businessman); T-347/14 Viktor 
Fedorovych Yanukovych v. Council (President of Ukraine 
2010 to 2014); T-434/14 Sergej Arbuzov v. Council (Prime 
Minister of Ukraine February to January 2014); T-717/14 and 
T-720/14 Arkady Rotenberg v. Council (Russian 
businessman). The cases involving companies include the 
proceedings initiated by Russian oil company Rosneft: T-
715/14. NK Rosneft et al v. Council.  
sanctions, nor trade financial instruments (bonds, etc.). 
Consequently, economic sanctions in this category do 
not only impact foreign persons, but may also restrict 
the activities of EU citizens and economic entities.
The third category includes specific punitive measures 
of economic diplomacy against Russia, which were 
introduced by the European Union in order to enhance 
the political clout and effects of the economic 
sanctions. This includes the Council decision 
requesting that the European Commission reassess, on 
a case by case basis, partnership programs between the 
EU and Russia, and to suspend certain programs.14 
Exempt from this review are programs implementing 
cross-border cooperation, as well as those involving 
Russian civil society. Furthermore, the Union 
cancelled a planned EU-Russia summit15 and decided 
against holding the usual bilateral negotiations, among 
others suspending negotiations on visa policy 
cooperation and on a new partnership agreement. As a 
joint diplomatic move, EU Member States prompted 
the suspension of accession negotiations between 
Russia and the OECD, as well as its associated 
International Energy Agency. In addition, the 40th G8 
summit, originally planned for Sochi was cancelled in 
2014, and instead, a G7 meeting without Russia was 
held in Brussels on 4-5 June 2014.16 Also of 
significance is that the European Council on 16 July 
2014 urged the European Investment Bank to postpone 
the signing of a new financing scheme for Russia,17 
with Member States indicating that they would be 
taking similar steps before the Board of Directors of 
the EBRD regarding approval of new funding 
schemes. 
 
III. Economic sanctions in narrative of the 
international economic law 
 
The subject of the subsequent analysis is the trade 
related provisions falling under the scope of WTO 
law, therefore the restrictions on weapons, dual-use 
products, goods and services related to special 
investments, the import ban on goods from the 
Crimean and rebel-controlled territories, as well as 
restrictions on business transactions involving certain 
companies on blacklists are of significance. However, 
we do not assess here neither the measures of 
14 See EU sanctions against Russia over Ukraine crisis. 
European Union Newsroom. Available at: 
http://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-
coverage/eu_sanctions/index_en.htm.  
15 EU restrictive measures in view of the situation in Eastern 
Ukraine and the illegal annexation of Crimea (Council, 
Background Note, Brussels, 29/07/2014). Available at: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/press
data/EN/foraff/144159.pdf.  
16 The Brussels G7 Summit Declaration (European 
Commission, Memo, Brussels, 5/06/2014). Available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-402_en.htm.  
17 See EU restrictive measures in view of the situation in 
Eastern Ukraine and the illegal annexation of Crimea 
(Council, Background Note, 29/07/2014). Available at: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/press
data/EN/foraff/144159.pdf.  
economic diplomacy limiting Russia's room to 
manoeuvre within international economic relations, 
nor the sanctions restricting movement of individuals, 
These economic sanction measures, at the first glance, 
seem to be contrary to the principles of the WTO law. 
First, the unilateral sanction might be incompatible 
with principle of most favored nation treatment18 that 
requires a WTO Member State to grant other Member 
States any preference immediately and without 
conditions in respect to its provisions on imports and 
exports, which the Member State in question provides 
to third countries. GATS incorporates the principle of 
most favored nation treatment,19 therefore the 
principle also involves the aspects of the EU sanctions 
on trade in services, such as the ban on oil industry 
investments or the activities of the banking sector. 
Second, the sanctions imposed by the EU are not 
compatible with the principle of national treatment 
(equal treatment). Under this principle, WTO 
members may not give products of other Member 
States inferior treatment from a regulatory perspective, 
than they do their own domestic products.20 
Therefore, the economic sanctions imposed by the 
European Union are in breach of the above principles, 
i.e. the EU's obligations based on GATT 1994 and 
GATS. Thus the essential question arises of whether 
the WTO law provides exceptions, legal basis for 
justifying the sanctions introduced by the EU. Not 
considering the exceptions that can be excluded prima 
facie,21 the only exceptional provision whose 
application could reasonably be taken into account is 
22 
Therefore I focus on this provision. 
The provision on essential security interest had been 
present in the original 1947 text of GATT, and was 
left unchanged by the 1994 revision. This same text 
was also used in Article XIVbis of GATS. On the 
whole, this exception provides leeway for Member 
States in cases where their essential security and their 
18 Article I of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
revision of the GATT text, this will be indicated by "GATT 
concerning the conclusion on behalf of the European 
Community, as regards matters within its competence, of the 
agreements reached in the Uruguay Round multilateral 
negotiations (1986-1994), Annex 1 (b), OJ L 336 
(23/12/1994) page 1 [Marrakesh Agreement].  
19 Marrakesh Agreement, Annex 1 (b): General Agreement 
on Trade in Services (GATS) Article II paragraph (1). GATS 
defines the principle of most favored nation treatment as 
y measure covered by this 
Agreement, each Member shall accord immediately and 
unconditionally to services and service suppliers of any other 
Member treatment no less favorable than that it accords to 
like services and service suppliers of any other country  
20 GATT Article III. 
21 Because of the special facts of the case, the general 
exceptions (GATT Article XX) do not apply and any other 
exemption allowing deviation from the principles is also 
logically excluded, such as free trade zones and customs 
unions (GATT Article XXIV). 
22 GATT Article XXI and GATS Article XIVbis.  
national security or security policy interest is at stake, 
and in such cases authorizes them to derogate from the 
obligations laid down by GATT 1994 and GATS. It
identifies three types of justification. First, Member 
States may refuse any provisions that would oblige 
them to issue information the disclosure of which 
would be contrary to the security interests of the 
Member State.23 Second, it authorizes Member States 
to freely take measures necessary for the protection of 
their national security interests, specifically referring 
to trade in arms, munitions and war material, as well 
as to times of war and to other emergencies in 
international relations.24 As the third option, it 
reaffirms that Member States may take measures to 
implement their tasks serving the maintenance of 
international peace and security under the UN 
Charter.25  
Among these options, the second might bear 
substantive significance in the context of legality of 
EU sanctions. However, past practice involving 
national security exceptions is restricted to a few 
concrete disputes, and so far no final decision has ever 
been issued in any dispute settlement procedure where 
a Member State has successfully based its justification 
of restrictive measures on the exception provisions of 
GATT Article XXI or GATS Article XIVbis. 
However some concrete cases in practice where 
consideration of national security interests was raised, 
suggest criteria that are relevant to the evaluation of 
the case of EU sanctions. The most important cases 
are as follows: 
a) Applicability of GATT Article XXI was raised for 
the first time in procedures26 brought by 
Czechoslovakia against the United States in 1949, the 
subject of which were export controls and a licensing 
system introduced by the USA. According to the 
United States, these restrictive measures were needed 
for national security reasons, and were applicable only 
to a narrow range of goods usable for military 
23 
Agreement shall be construed] to require any contracting 
party to furnish any information the disclosure of which it 
considers contrary to 
24 
Agreement shall be construed] to prevent any contracting 
party from taking any action which it considers necessary for 
the protection of its essential security interests (i) relating to 
fissionable materials or the materials from which they are 
derived; (ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and 
implements of war and to such traffic in other goods and 
materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose 
of supplying a military establishment; (iii) taken in time of 
 
25 
Agreement shall be construed] to prevent any contracting 
party from taking any action in pursuance of its obligations 
under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of 
 
26 US  Export Restrictions, GATT/CP. 3/SR.22 (8 June 
1949), Third Session  Summary Record of the Twenty-
Second Meeting, pp. 4 10. Available at: 
https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/90060100.p
df.  
purposes. The legal basis of the measures was cited to 
be GATT Article XXI paragraph (b) (iii), i.e. it 
referred to an emergency in international relations to 
justify the measures. The GATT contracting parties 
subsequently rejected Czechoslovakia's application27 
and did not set up a working group for an inquiry into 
the dispute.28 In addition, no definition of the essence 
of the essential security interest had been formulated, 
which at the end of the negotiations Czechoslovakia 
interpreted as Member States themselves being able to 
determine what measures they consider necessary for 
the protection their security interests.29 
b) While not considered formal dispute resolution, the 
relevance of GATT Article XXI was raised in 
connection with Portugal's accession in 1961. At that 
time, Ghana maintained a boycott of goods originating 
from Portugal, in response to the Portuguese 
Government's policy towards Africa, specifically in 
reference to the crisis in Angola. Similarly to the 
previously discussed case, Ghana also cited GATT 
Article XXI paragraph (b) (iii) as the basis for its 
restrictive measures and concluded that both concrete 
and potential dangers may threaten the security 
interests of a state.30 
c) In 1975, in the case of a ban introduced by Sweden 
on footwear used by the military,31 reference was also 
made to GATT Article XXI, however, that case also 
did not make it to formal dispute resolution. Sweden 
argued that the import ban served to maintain  in 
reality, protect  its crisis-hit domestic production, a 
measure necessary for Swedish national security 
policy. Member States made an important 
determination to the effect as stated that GATT Article 
XXI does not require consultation, 32 i.e. a state whose 
interest is served by restrictions may take the 
necessary measures unilaterally.33 As elsewhere, it is 
apparent in this case that the applicability of the article 
is greatly influenced by who is able to interpret the 
scope of GATT Article XXI, whether the Member 
State itself is allowed to autonomously determine the 
scope of goods considered national security risks, or 
27 US  Export Restrictions, pp. 8 10. 
28 This initial case arose before the establishment of the WTO 
panel. 
29 US  Export Restrictions, p. 10. 
30 Summary Record of the Eleventh Meeting, 
SR.19/11/Corr.1 (28 December 1961), p. 196. Available at: 
https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/90280183.p
df.  
31 Sweden  Import Restrictions on Certain Footwear, 
L/4250, 17 November 1975. Available at: 
https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/90920073.p
df.  
32 Sweden  Import Restrictions on Certain Footwear, p. 3.  
33 GATT Council Meeting, Minutes of Meeting (10 
November 1975), C/M/109. p. 9. Available at: 
https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/90430147.p
df.  
whether there are objective conditions for that.34 These 
questions still remain unanswered.35
d) The past case closest to the current EU sanctions 
against Russia concerns the economic sanctions 
imposed on Argentina by the EEC, Canada and 
Australia, the background to which was the armed 
conflict in the Falkland Islands between the United 
Kingdom and Argentina, as well as the 
implementation of the subsequent UN Security 
Council decision 502 of 1982.36 As a result of the 
negotiations of the GATT contracting parties, a 
separate decision was adopted on issues concerning 
the application of GATT Article XXI.37 The 
importance of the decision lay in that it clarified 
several procedural issues around the application of the 
national security exception. First, it stated that 
contracting parties subject to restrictions must be 
provided the broadest possible information by the 
sanctioning state about the measures implemented. 
Above all, this was meant to clarify the application of 
the exception referred to by GATT Article XXI 
paragraph (a). In other words, it sought to prevent 
interpretation of the above-mentioned GATT Article 
XXI paragraph (a) in a way that allowed the 
sanctioning state to fully restrict the disclosure to the 
affected state of information relating to the sanctions. 
Second, it also made it clear that states subject to 
sanctions retain all their rights deriving from their 
GATT membership. Last, the decision authorized the 
GATT Council to specify, on request, further criteria 
with reference to specific economic sanctions. The 
decision did not address the substantive issues, 
however, two additional aspects are evident from the 
text. Firstly, the wording of the document implied that 
judging the existence of national security interests is at 
the full discretion of Member States.38 Secondly, the 
decision clearly stated that signatories introducing 
restrictions must take into account the interests of 
affected third states.39 
34 Taking an example, the connection between army boots 
and the essential security interest is palpable, but it is 
questionable whether a state should be able to restrict trade 
e.g. in slippers used by the military.  
35 ALFORD, R. P. (2011): The Self-Judging WTO Security 
Exception, p. 697 759.  
36 The decision acknowledged that the UK may cite self-
defense if Argentine troops did not leave the Falkland 
Islands. See: Resolution 502 (1982) of 3 April 1982. 
Available at: 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/5
02%281982%29.  
37 Decision concerning Article XXI of the General 
Agreement (30 November 1982), L/5426 (2 December 1982). 
Available at: 
https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/english/SULPDF/91000212.p
df.  
38 Decision concerning Article XXI of the General 
Agreement, first paragraph of the preamble: "Considering 
that the exceptions envisaged in Article XXI of the General 
Agreement constitute an important element for safeguarding 
the rights of contracting parties when they consider that 
 
39 Decision concerning Article XXI of the General 
Agreement, third paragraph of the preamble. 
e) The dispute on the embargo imposed by the United 
States on Nicaragua in 1985 was also a case of 
significance.40 The United States cited GATT Article 
XXI as justification for the economic sanctions on the 
grounds that the revolutionary Sandinista leadership 
governing Nicaragua at the time posed a real threat to 
US national security and foreign policy.41 Nicaragua 
rejected this argument, and requested to set up a panel. 
However, since the panel's mandate did not allow to 
examine the USA's justification referencing GATT 
Article XXI, i.e. the existence of the national security 
interest cited by the USA, the panel in its conclusions 
could not state that the USA had complied with the 
requirements arising from GATT Article XXI, nor that 
it was in violation of its obligations under GATT.42 
The limited mandate of the panel and its self-
restriction allows us to conclude that GATT Article 
XXI leaves to Member States the justification of the 
existence of the national security interest, i.e. it is up 
to each Member State's judgment and discretion what 
circumstances can be considered essential to its 
security. 
f) After the establishment of the WTO, there has been 
one case under the new dispute settlement procedure 
where the possibility of exemption based on GATT 
Article XXI was raised: the dispute initiated by the EC 
against the United States,43 in the wake of the 
sanctions introduced by the Helms Burton Act.44 The 
restrictions imposed by the USA included sanctions on 
goods of Cuban origin, entry restrictions on Cuban 
nationals and other economic sanctions against Cuban 
companies. The EC argued that the embargo measures 
violated several obligations arising from GATT. 
According to the US, imposition of sanctions served 
its essential security interests, and also cited the fact 
that it was not considered entirely commercial in 
nature, so it argued that the dispute did not fall within 
the scope of the provisions of GATT-WTO.45 After 
consultation, the Dispute Settlement Body set up a 
40 For a substantial analysis, see: HENDERSON, J. C. 
(1986): Legality of Economic Sanctions under International 
Law: The Case of Nicaragua. 
41 BOSSCHE, P. V. D.  / ZDOUC, W. (2013): The Law and 
Policy of the World Trade Organization, p. 597 598.  
42 US  Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua (Report by the 
Panel, L/6053, 13 October 1986), para. 5.3. Available at: 
https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/91240197.p
df. 
43 US  The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act 
(Helms Burton) (DS38).  
44 The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) 
Act of 1996 (Helms Burton Act, Pub.L. 104 114, 110 Stat. 
6091). The federal law was intended 
to further tighten the embargo on Cuba. A 1996 incident in 
which the Cuban air force downed two private aircraft flying 
under American flag played a part in the bolstering of the 
legislation. The aircraft were operated by an association 
established by Cuban refugees, and which they used to 
regularly fly into Cuban airspace to spread flyers.  
45 Minutes of DSB meeting of 16 October 1996 
(WT/DSB/M/24), p. 7. Available at: 
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/DDFDocument
s/21715/Q/WT/DSB/M24.pdf.  
panel, but later suspended its proceedings at the 
request of the EC, and eventually the proceedings 
ended without a decision on the case's merits.
The GATT Article XXI paragraph (c), i.e. taking 
measures to implement tasks serving the maintenance 
of international peace and security under the UN 
Charter has not been cited in any dispute settlement 
case so far. Similarly, there has not been any past 
practice to date involving the exception provision in 
GATS Article XIVbis, however, since the text of that 
article is identical to GATT Article XXI, the past 
practice examined above might also be applicable to 
GATS. 
 
IV. The legality of economic sanctions imposed by 
the EU on Russia 
 
Considering the above criteria arising from the past 
case law, it is plausible that the exception in GATT 
Article XXI paragraph (a) does not bear significant 
relevance, since the economic sanctions imposed by 
the EU were adopted and published in a transparent 
way as part of the foreign and security policy decision-
making process, so justification on the retention of 
information is likely not necessary. It is important to 
note, moreover, that GATT Article XXI and also 
similarly GATS Article XIVbis  does not define 
additional criteria beyond the aforementioned 
exceptions, i.e. it does not contain requirements like 
the introductory provisions of GATT Article XX (the 
so-called chapeau). In addition to that, also GATT 
Article XXI paragraph (c) can be excluded from the 
scope of the analysis, since the economic sanctions 
imposed by the European Union on the Russian 
Federation were introduced unilaterally and not on the 
basis of a UN mandate. Therefore, the justification of 
the EU's restrictive provisions hypothetically  could 
based on GATT Article XXI (b). 
When applying the exceptions under GATT Article 
XXI paragraph (b), the EU must justify the existence 
of national security interests, the necessity of the 
action and the circumstances of any special cases 
(trade in fissionable material or weapons and war or 
emergency). Justification of the existence of the 
national security interest in the case of the European 
Union sanctions provides much leeway, since on the 
basis of the above-mentioned practice 
(Czechoslovakia-USA trade dispute; and decision 
issued on the embargo by the EEC, Canada and 
Australia on Argentina) the determination of the 
national security interest is at the discretion of the state 
concerned. In particular, the argument appearing in the 
US-Nicaragua dispute implies that the merits of such a 
decision on the existence of the security interest 
cannot be reconsidered by the panel.  
As a result, it is up to the discretion of the EU to 
determine the extent to which the Russian-Ukrainian 
crisis, deepening in the wake of the annexation of 
Crimea, is considered a threatening concern to the 
national security and foreign policy of Member States. 
Such a concern could be the fact that the Russian 
Federation had violated the sovereignty of Ukraine, 
had engaged armed forces, which the heads of state 
and government condemned in their declaration of 6 
March 2014 and also called on Russia to immediately 
recall its forces to their permanent bases in accordance 
with the relevant agreements.46 In addition, the aspects 
emerging from the Portugal Ghana dispute further 
expand the room for manoeuvre, namely not only 
actual but potential security risks may also be cited as 
circumstances threatening the national security 
interest. 
Another question is what requirements to apply for the 
justification of necessity. In contrast with GATT 
Article XX, which requires the express justification of 
necessity, it is a plausible interpretation of GATT 
Article XXI that proof of necessity is merely a formal 
requirement. This can be deduced grammatically from 
the wording of the text, which refers to a national 
security interest "which [the contracting party] 
considers necessary". It also follows logically from 
the above that if the definition of a national security 
interest is entirely at the discretion of the Member 
State, then the national security interest also in itself 
implies that the sanctions imposed are necessary for 
the protection of this interest. Thus if we accept broad 
discretion, the latter interpretation seems probable.  
Finally, it should be noted that in justifying the special 
circumstances in the context of the application of the 
EU sanctions, GATT Article XXI paragraph (b) (i), 
which exempts restrictions on fissile materials, is 
irrelevant for the case in point. In contrast, either of 
the other two options may be considered as the legal 
basis for justification. In paragraph (b) (ii) the 
provisions on the traffic in arms, ammunition and 
implements of war for the purpose of supplying a 
military establishment are related to the parts of the 
EU economic sanctions dealing with the arms 
embargo. Due to the aspects of past practice, however, 
it is not determined whether this exception is 
applicable to dual-use goods such as war supplies 
serving, among others, military establishments. 
Fundamentally, deciding this point is not necessarily 
essential, since of the third basis for exception, i.e. the 
special circumstances in paragraph (b) (iii), namely 
war or other emergency in international relations, the 
latter appears to be justifiable in the context of the 
escalation of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. This 
exception allows for the justification of provisions 
with substantially broader and general scope and 
without specific focus on particular goods and, could 
therefore, if necessary, be applied to restrictions on 
dual-use products. The interpretation of "other 
emergency" is not clear, but as before, the 
grammatical interpretation here also allows for a great 
degree of discretion. In addition to war, "other 
emergency" could mean a broader set of international 
conflicts, however, on the basis of the context, these 
46 See Council decision of 2014/145/CFSP, first paragraph of 
the preamble (OJ L 78/16, 17/03/2014). 
are supposedly serious conflicts in essence comparable 
to war.47
In cases relying on this as the legal basis for 
justification, it is therefore assumed that the grave 
nature of the crisis would play a role, however we 
could not find examples in past practice which would 
provide guidance for this issue. Of the previously cited 
examples, the boycott imposed by Ghana on 
Portuguese goods is comparable to the Russia-Ukraine 
crisis. In this case, Ghana claimed that the crisis afoot 
in Angola constituted a continued threat to peace and 
security in whole Africa, and used this to cite GATT 
Article XXI paragraph (b) (iii), but as mentioned 
above, the proceedings did not result in a decision on 
the merits of the case. Consequently, in justifying the 
EU sanctions, the events following the annexation of 
the Crimean peninsula, tacit support for armed 
resistance in rebel-controlled areas and the consequent 
crisis may be argued to support the reference to "other 
emergency". 
 
V. Final remarks  
 
I have argued in the above analysis that the 
justification of the economic sanctions imposed by the 
EU on Russia might be feasible by reference to the 
great discretion for justifying the existence of an 
essential security interest and of special circumstances, 
but fundamentally due to the slight background of the 
relevant case law, the precise interpretation of the 
specific provisions of the exception clauses is not clear 
in all respects. In addition, both past practice and the 
current case at hand clearly demonstrate that economic 
sanctions are considered instruments that can be 
interpreted by way of external trade policy and law 
considerations, but in practical terms, their 
fundamental objectives unavoidably stretch beyond 
trade policy and may appear to merely serve foreign 
policy objectives. In other terms, the two perspectives 
- nctions are bound to 
states introducing sanctions, which leads us back to 
the pure interest of the country. Therefore, the circle is 
compl
 
That is vital because this nature of economic sanctions 
inherently makes legal review difficult and therefore 
the WTO Member States rather opt to resolve their 
disputes on economic sanctions outside the WTO. As 
a consequence, the analysis can only conclude that 
hypothetically, the legality of measures comparable to 
the EU economic sanctions can be derived from 
application GATT Article XXI (b), however, due to 
the nature of the measure, it is not expected that the 
questions regarding the legality will be channeled into 
the dispute settlement mechanism. Accordingly the 
47 
Secondary Sanctions Relating to Petroleum Transactions with 
Iran. 
-
sanctions could not become more characteristic and 
the foreign policy perspective can continue to 
dominate the scene. 
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